From Guardian Project Wiki

Contents 1 User Scenario Points 1.1 The Small Cabal 1.2 Diffuse Activist Organization 1.3 Multinational Org 1.4 Improv Movement organized via social networking 1.5 Foreign Journalist, Diplomat, or Business Person

User Scenario Points

• for User Story Narratives based on these points, see: User scenarios to guide our crypto development

The Small Cabal

• small group of people and meets up in person
• needs to communicate as securely and anonymously as possible
• all sign every other's key in person
• local-only, unpublishable signatures
• no one uploads their keys to any other server or device
• generate a revocation certificate and hook it up to their panic button app
• panic button broadcasts the revocation certificate to a pre-determined list of people

Diffuse Activist Organization

• working in a country that aggressively tracks communications
• many people meet in person at various places around the country
• some people also travel to regional and national meet-ups
• very few participants meet everyone in the organization
• the central forum for the whole group is on the internet
• lots of big group discussions and announcements

• each person has a key, they post it to the PGP keyservers
• they generate a revocation certificate
• they do not post any signatures to the key servers
• whenever they meet another person that they trust, they sign each others' keys and swap all signature data using direct p2p communication

• they establish the first step of trust via OTR question/answer
• they can then check whether they have PGP trust path to each others' keys

• when they hit the panic button the post the revocation certificate to the keyserver
• each client automatically checks the public keyservers regularly for revocations

Multinational Org

• many people work in countries where the government does not aggressively monitor communications
• a handful of people work in high risk environments from time to time
• there are also local contacts in aggressively monitored countries working with the org

• local operatives use only private signatures

• the public figures want to have a public trust profile
  • they use the public PGP infrastructure
  • they publicly share all public signatures
  • private signatures are in lsign format, so they cannot be shared

• all signatures are always sent to the key owner via email
• signer can mark the signature as private or public
  • a private signature uses an "lsign" which cannot be exported to the keyservers
• the key owner can then decide how to manage the signatures
  • privately import the signature to their keyring, where it will be stored in an unpublishable format
  • publicly import the signature into their keyring and sync it via the public PGP servers

Improv Movement organized via social networking

• loosely or barely connected groups of people
• want to avoid active keyword, etc filtering
• relatively open and public infrastructure
• frequently infiltrated in certain pockets

• TOFU/POP (Trust On First Use/Persistence of Pseudonym)
• OTR question/answer, if they have shared context
• can share TOFU/POP status with others to build trust in keys

Foreign Journalist, Diplomat, or Business Person

• clear outsider status
• want to keep private communications private in the face of government monitoring
• has strong links to institutions outside of the country in case of trouble
• needs standard crypto tools made easy to use